


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
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
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BRAZIL: FOREIGN MINISTER MAGALHAES PINTO CONSIDERS BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR POLICY A "POLITICAL QUESTION."

[REDACTED] THE FOREIGN MINISTER HOPES TO HAVE A "BRASS TACKS" PRIVATE TALK WITH SECRETARY RUSK NEXT WEEK TO NEGOTIATE THE "MOST HE CAN OBTAIN" FOR BRAZIL, WHICH WILL ALSO ASSIST HIM IN HIS CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

MAGALHAES PINTO MAY BE CONSIDERING A MORE CO-OPERATIVE POLICY ON THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AS A LEVER TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE US ON THIS OR SOME OTHER ISSUE. HE IS QUOTED [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AS SAYING THAT HE HAD ALREADY OBTAINED MUCH FROM THE SOVIETS AND WAS CONVINCED HE COULD OBTAIN ADDITIONAL BENEFITS FROM THE US. HIS CURRENT STATEMENTS ARE IN CONTRAST TO HIS EARLIER PRIVATE REMARKS THAT HE WOULD GO TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO OPPOSE THE TREATY.

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
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